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Abstract 
 
This paper challenges the consensus on the nature of unemployment dynamics in Britain.  We show 
that the argument that changes in unemployment arise mostly from changes in the duration of 
unemployment (rather than in the chance of becoming unemployed) is flawed.  In fact, while 
shocks to the outflow do have a part to play up to the late 1970s, the huge changes in 
unemployment over the last two decades have been mostly driven by inflow shocks.  Our model 
also provides a new explanation of aggregate unemployment persistence based on externalities at a 
market level rather than individual-level persistence. 
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Unemployment Dynamics, Duration and 
Equilibrium:  Evidence from Britain 
 
Simon Burgess and HJlPne Turon 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper challenges the consensus on the nature of unemployment dynamics in Britain (and indeed 
in much of the rest of Europe).  We show that the argument that changes in unemployment arise 
mostly from changes in the duration of unemployment (rather than in the chance of becoming 
unemployed) is flawed.  In fact, while shocks to the outflow do have a part to play up to the late 
1970s, the huge changes in unemployment over the last two decades have been mostly driven by the 
shocks to the inflow.  We also provide a new explanation of the persistence and complex dynamics 
in unemployment, an explanation based on externalities at a market level rather than individual-level 
persistence. 
It is widely believed that changes in unemployment arise mostly from changes in the duration 
of unemployment, rather than in the chance of becoming unemployed.  In other words, the outflow 
rate matters more than the inflow rate; indeed, the standard view of the data appears to show that 
the inflow rate is largely irrelevant.  Components of these views can be found for example in 
Pissarides (1986), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), OECD (1994), and Nickell (1999).  
Possibly as a consequence of this, most policy directed at reducing unemployment focuses on 
improving the employability and search effectiveness of the currently unemployed.  In this paper, we 
argue that the unemployment rate, the outflow rate and the inflow rate are all jointly endogenous 
variables.  We show that since the late 1970s inflow rate shocks are far more important than outflow 
rate shocks in explaining the dynamics of unemployment.  This occurs because the inflow rate is 
more responsive to aggregate shocks than the outflow rate.  This fact is explained by our theoretical 
framework:  the importance of endogenous employed job search amplifies the effect of the cycle on 
the inflow and damps the effect on the outflow.  Consequently, we argue that the high correlation 
between the unemployment rate and the outflow rate (and its inverse, the average unemployment 
duration) is largely driven by the unemployment rate influencing the outflow rate and not vice versa.  
That is, the huge rises in unemployment duration are in fact an endogenous response to the higher 
unemployment itself and not its main source.  The higher unemployment in turn comes mostly from 
inflow rate shocks. 
The dynamics of unemployment are not well understood; at some times unemployment 
seems to be characterised by persistence and to change very slowly; at other times it changes 
dramatically.  Models of hysteresis or persistence in general have been proposed, though none 
appear to fit the data very well.  Dissatisfaction has been expressed with our understanding of 
unemployment dynamics by Bean (1994), Karanassou and Snower (1998), Nickell (1998), and 
Machin and Manning (1999) among others; see also the collection of papers edited by Henry, 
Nickell and Snower (2000).  Most models are based on individual level persistence or on the 
specification of the wage equation.  Our model explains the apparently non-linear dynamics in 
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unemployment, including persistence in the sense of a slow response to some shocks.  We show that 
the model implies asymmetric responses to 
positive and negative shocks, and much slower reaction to large adverse shocks.  That is, if 
unemployment is increased substantially above equilibrium, its rate of decline can be very slow.  
Normal shocks on the other hand are dissipated quickly.  Our persistence model is based on the 
externalities arising in the job search process with employed job searchers1.  These imply that high 
levels of unemployment reduce the outflow rate and raise the inflow rate; these effects work to offset 
the decline back to equilibrium and thus produce a slow change in unemployment. 
To address these issues in this paper we first set up a framework for thinking about the 
relationships between the unemployment flows and the stock.  We provide an economic model to 
support that framework.  This is all in the next section.  Section 3 briefly discusses the data.  Section 
4 reports on some simple techniques to explore the inter-related dynamics of the unemployment flow 
rates and the stock and Section 5 presents the results of our estimation.  Section 6 illustrates the 
implications of these results using simulations.  Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Theory 
 
In this section we do two things.  First, we show that by adopting a simple and intuitive model for 
the inflow and outflow rates, we can generate some striking results relating to the dynamics and 
duration of unemployment.  Second, we provide a theoretical framework from which can be derived 
the foregoing model for the flow rates.  We present the material in this order because it seems likely 
that other models could be used to derive the flow relationships, and therefore the particular details 
of the path we chose are less important.  The key, necessary feature of the relationships is that the 
flow rates depend on the unemployment rate and the business cycle; this seems an unobjectionable 
feature and likely to arise in a number of different settings.   
 
(a)  Equilibria 
 
We leave the details of the model to later and start by specifying the unemployment flow rates.  The 
inflow rate, i, is defined as the number of people becoming unemployed (I) divided by the stock of 
employed (N).  The outflow rate, x, is defined as the number of people leaving unemployment (X) 
divided by the stock of unemployed (U); the unemployed and employed together make up the 
labour force:  U + N = L.  We later discuss the duration of unemployment; this is clearly related to 
the outflow rate, and under some (common) assumptions average duration is simply the inverse of 
the outflow rate. 
We begin by assuming simple reduced forms for the inflow and outflow rates: 
 
i i u Zt t t it= ( , , )y        (1) 
x x u Zt t t xt= ( , , )y        (2) 
 
                                                                 
1 Boeri (1999) has recently also argued for a relationship between employed job search and unemployment, 
although in a very different context.  His model relates to the role of employment protection in generating 
pressures for job search by the employed, and thence affecting equilibrium unemployment.   
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where u is the unemployment rate U/L, y  represents an untrended business cycle and Zj, j = i, x, 
denote sets of exogenous variables.  To complete the system, we have the intertemporal 
unemployment flow identity2: 
 
u u i u u x u i x it t t t t t t t t t+ = + - - = - - +1 1 1( ) ( )     (3) 
 
We therefore have three equations with three endogenous variables (u i xt t t, , ) determined 
by the exogenous variables (y t it xtZ Z, , ).  To investigate this system we need to make an 
assumption about the signs of the variables in (1) and (2); the effect of unemployment on i and x is 
crucial.  The standard assumption would be as follows:  high unemployment reduces wages, raises 
labour demand and hence reduces inflows and raises outflows.  This implies i xu u< >0 0, .  There 
is, however, another mechanism at work based on thinking about the unemployment flows as part of 
the whole set of labour market flows .  Briefly, the intuition for this is as follows:  a cyclical upturn 
reduces the need for firms to fire workers (reducing the inflow) and creates more vacancies thus 
raising the flow out of unemployment.  High unemployment reduces possibilities for job-to-job 
moves, thus channelling more people fired by their firms into unemployment.  High unemployment 
also has a negative impact on the flow rate out of unemployment:  this can arise through a number of 
mechanisms implying that the increase in unemployment does not increase vacancy generation 
enough to keep the job finding rate constant.  The analysis below derives these results.  This line of 
argument suggests the following signs i xu u> <0 0, .   
We choose to concentrate on the latter case in our analysis in this section.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, this case produces some interesting and novel adjustment dynamics similar to those 
observed in the data; the opposite (standard) case produces nothing new3.  Second, this is the case 
that our empirical work below supports.  We therefore assume the following signs for (1) and (2): 
 
i i x xu u> < < >0 0 0 0, , ,y y       (4) 
 
The equilibrium rate of unemployment, u* , is derived by setting ut+1 = ut in (3), substituting 
(1) and (2) in, and setting the business cycle y  = 0: 
 
u
i u Z
i u Z x u Z
i
i x
*
*
* *
( , )
( , ) ( , )
=
+
      (5) 
 
The dependence of i() and x() on u make this different from the usual closed form 
equilibrium unemployment formulation (u = i/(i+x)).  We can explore the different results this 
implies most easily4 by assuming simple linear forms for (1) and (2): 
 
x Z ut x t= -a b         (6) 
i Z ut i t= +g d         (7) 
 
                                                                 
2 We assume zero growth in the labour force. 
3 In contrast to the case analysed below, this produces a unique feasible equilibrium unemployment rate with 
stable, fast-adjusting dynamics. 
4 In the general case, we have from (5) that u* is a negative function of x/i.  Combining (1) and (2) we have that x/i 
is  a negative function of u*.  These two functions may cross one or more times. 
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with y  = 0, and (aZx, b, gZi, d) all positive.  In this case we end up with a quadratic for u* with 
roots: 
 
u
Z Zx i
1 2
*
( )
=
+ - -
-
a g d
b d
K
      (8a) 
u
Z Zx i
2 2
*
( )
=
+ - +
-
a g d
b d
K
      (8b) 
 
where K = + - - -( ) ( )a g d b d gZ Z Zx i i
2 4 ; we assume the term under the square root sign and 
(b - d) to be positive5.  Note that u u2 1
* * ( )= + -K b d ; also note that K depends on Zi and Zx, so 
that this distance between the equilibria depends on the structural factors.  We can then deduce the 
equilibrium inflow and outflow rates by substituting (8) into (6) and (7).  In this model, the 
unemployment rate, outflow rate and inflow rate are all jointly determined equilibrium outcomes. 
The possibility of multiple equilibria in this model derives simply from the dependence of 
either or both of the flow rates on the unemployment stock.  The intuition for the case of two 
equilibria is straightforward:  a high unemployment rate implies a high inflow rate and low outflow 
rate, supporting the high unemployment rate; conversely a low unemployment rate yields a low 
inflow rate and high outflow rate thereby returning a low unemployment rate. 
 
(b)  Dynamics 
 
We first check for the stability of the equilibria.  Substituting in from the equilibrium linear forms of 
(1) and (2) into the intertemporal identity (3) we reach: 
 
u u Z Z u u u u u jt t x i j t j t j+ - = - + + - - + - - =1
22 1 2( ( ) ( ) )( ) ( )( ) ,* * *d a g b d b d  
 
We can use this to evaluate the dynamics around each of the two equilibria we identified 
above: 
 
u u u u u ut t t t+ - = - - + - -1 1 1
2K( ) ( )( )* *b d     (9a) 
u u u u u ut t t t+ - = - + - -1 2 2
2K( ) ( )( )* *b d     (9b)  
 
where recall K > 0 and (b - d) > 0.  Note the presence of the squared term in unemployment 
disequilibrium implying a non-linear response of Dut+1 to (ut – u*).  This arises as long as b  and d 
are not both zero, and are not equal.  This nonlinearity is the basis for the ‘non-standard’ dynamics 
in unemployment we discuss below. 
It is easy to see from (9b) that u2
* is an unstable equilibrium.  Shocks increasing 
unemployment above u2
*  lead ut off to the maximum feasible level; negative shocks lead down to 
u1
* .  Around the low equilibrium, for ut < u1* unemployment is increasing.  And for u1* < ut < u2* 
unemployment is decreasing.   
We should emphasise two points:  first, our argument is not the usual multiple equilibria one 
that unemployment is characterised by spending time at the two equilibria, since the high equilibrium 
                                                                 
5 Our empirical work below confirms this. 
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is unstable and the process would not remain there for significant periods of time.  Second, the 
implication that unemployment rises continuously beyond u2* is not a worry:  a fuller model would 
include a policy reaction function affecting y that would produce counter-vailing forces once 
unemployment became very high.  Our interest is in the more complex and interesting dynamics 
affecting unemployment following an adverse shock from u1
* .  This arguably characterises much of 
the recent labour market history of the UK (and the rest of Europe).   
The main results can be seen most easily by plotting out the function in (9a) relating the 
change in unemployment to the disequilibrium – Figure 1.  This shows the following results.  First, 
the response is not symmetric for positive and negative shocks.  Second, and more importantly, 
large and small shocks produce different reactions.  In fact small shocks (defined as less than 
K/2(b - d)) lead to a large subsequent fall in unemployment and are dissipated relatively quickly.  
Large shocks (between K/2(b - d)) and K/(b - d)) produce a slower reaction of unemployment 
and consequently take longer to disappear.  That is, once unemployment is shocked up to just 
below the upper equilibrium, it decreases only very slowly.   
One way to illustrate this is to compute the ‘half-life’ of shocks for this model.  Adopting a 
continuous time version of the model6 and parameter values from the estimation described below, 
we can plot out the half-life T of a shock of size S – see Figure 2.  This is given by 
T K=
-
-
é
ëê
ù
ûú
-1 2
1
ln
l
l
       (10) 
 
where l b d= -S K( ( )) , showing the dependence of T on the size of the shock relative to the 
distance between the two equilibria.  We see that the half-life is low for shocks up to around 70% of 
the distance between the two equilibria, but thereafter increases sharply.  Given our parameters, for 
a shock equal to 90% of the distance between the two equilibria, the half-life is over four years.  
Here is a potential explanation of the peculiar dynamics of unemployment, that have been described 
as hysteresis, persistence, and so on.   
The intuition for this persistence is as follows.  Following a large shock pushing 
unemployment up to a high level, the inflow rate increases and the outflow rate falls.  Unemployment 
falls as it is above equilibrium, but these endogenous adjustments of the rates mean that this fall is 
very slow. 
 
(c)  Duration 
 
The final implication of the model set out above relates to unemployment duration, the inverse of the 
outflow rate.  The dependence of the exit rate on the unemployment rate implies that the duration of 
unemployment is endogenous to the process.  The high correlation between duration and 
unemployment (see below) is often taken to demonstrate that high unemployment is an “outflow 
problem”.  In fact, in our model, it could equally well arise from high unemployment leading to high 
duration – we show below that this is partly the case.  Also, unemployment duration depends on the 
inflow process.  Long run changes in the inflow (changes in Zi) affect the equilibrium outflow rate7, 
and pulses in the inflow will have a dynamic effect.  Indeed, if the inflow shock is sufficiently high, 
                                                                 
6 This is du t dt K u t u u t u( ) ( ( ) ) ( )( ( ) )* *= - - + - -1 1
2b d  
7 Substituting for u from (6a) into the outflow rate expression. 
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pushing unemployment into the slow adjustment region, then an inflow shock will have long-lasting 
effects on duration. 
 
(d)  Model of labour market flows  
 
In this section we sketch out a model from which we derive i i u Zi= ( , , )y  and 
x x u Z x= ( , , )y above
8.  The obvious route in constructing such a model is to start from and modify 
the workhorse model in the field, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994, 1999).  However, this is not 
very productive since one factor playing a key role in the argument of this paper is the importance of 
employed job search and direct job-to-job moves, and this is largely at odds with the Mortensen 
and Pissarides setup9.  We therefore need to come at this using a different framework, albeit one 
based in the ideas of search and matching, job creation and destruction.  The focus of this paper is 
largely empirical and we show below that the facts fit well within our framework.  We do not at all 
claim that the model presented here is the only way of deriving the forms for i() and x() given above, 
but it is a useful way to understand the behaviour underlying the effects.  The key points of the paper 
are that both the inflow and outflow rates depend on unemployment, and that employed job search 
means that the inflow rather than the outflow is the main transmission mechanism for macro shocks 
to affect unemployment.  These are supported by the model set out below.   
2.i  Workers 
 
The model is set in a search and matching environment with imperfect information on job 
opportunities and dispersed trading.  We follow convention in assuming that all the unemployed 
engage in job search.  However, we also assume that job search is feasible for the employed.  This 
is certainly a reasonable assumption granted the number of people we observe moving directly from 
one job to another:  around about half of all new hires come from the ranks of the already-employed 
(Burgess, 1994; Boeri, 1999).  We assume that some endogenous fraction of the employed, f, 
engage in job search.  On-the-job search theory shows that this fraction depends chiefly on the 
probability of receiving an offer and a variety of other factors such as fear of job loss, job changing 
costs and the like10, f q( , )N z1 , where f is the fraction of the employed engaged in search, q
N is the 
offer arrival rate for the employed and z1 collects a set of exogenous variables.  As the job offer rate 
increases, more of the employed are tempted to search for a better job.  This is one of the key 
behavioural responses in the model, and the elasticity is denoted hf q, .   
We can now define the transition rates for the two searching groups.  The outflow rate from 
unemployment is simply the job offer probability for the unemployed11.  The job-to-job quit rate is 
                                                                 
8 This is based on some previous work by one of us on employed job search,  job competition, and inflows (see 
Burgess, 1992b, 1993, 1994). 
9 See their 1999 survey where the model, once extended to include quits, explicitly does not include the full 
effects of the quits.  Mortensen (1994) adapts the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) to include job search by the 
employed.  However, the assumptions imply that all jobs quit from are destroyed.  It follows that total separations 
(quits plus fires) equals total jobs destroyed; and that total hires equals  total jobs created.  This is strongly 
counterfactual since worker flows far exceed job flows: see Burda and Wyplosz (1994), Boeri (1999) and Burgess, 
Lane and Stevens (2000).   
10 This can be derived from optimising behaviour by workers – see Burdett (1978), Mortensen (1986), Burgess 
(1992a). 
11 In common with most of the search and matching literature we ignore offer acceptance issues. 
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equal to the fraction of workers engaging in job search multiplied by the job offer rate for the 
employed: 
 
q zN N= f q q( , ).1        (11) 
x U= q         (12) 
 
where q is the job-to-job quit rate and x is the unemployment exit rate.  Note that the employed and 
unemployed may well face different offer arrival rates.  There are two points here.  The first is the 
search intensity of the searchers, which may be different between the two groups.  Second, each unit 
of search effort may yield unequal numbers of offers for the two groups.  See Anderson and Burgess 
(2000) for a brief review and some evidence.   
We assume the existence of a matching function, based on vacancies and the total number of 
job searchers, J: 
 
M = M (J, V, z2)       (13) 
 
where M is the number of matches, J is the total number of searchers, V is vacancies and z2 is 
matching efficiency (including the search intensity of firms).  J is given by J = U + f(qN, z1).  N or 
dividing by the labour force: 
 
j = u + (1 – u) f(qN, z1)       (14) 
 
We can now define q.  Let us assume initially that both unemployed and employed job 
searchers are treated identically by firms and face the same offer arrival rates; that is, assume 
q q qN U m j= = = .   
So q and j are jointly determined as functions of m and u.  We can now use our analysis of 
job search along with the matching function to determine the transition rates.  The outflow rate and 
quit rates can be written as: 
 
x
m j v z
j m u z
u v z zx= = =q w
( , , )
( , , )
( , , , )2
1
1 2      (15) 
q z u v z zq= =f q q w( , ). ( , , , )1 1 2      (16) 
 
The key elasticities for these functions are: 
 
h
g
bh af q
x v,
, ( )
=
+ -
>
1 1
0       (17a) 
h
b a
bh af q
x u,
,
( )
( )
= -
-
+ -
<
1
1 1
0       (17b) 
h
g h
bh a
hf q
f q
q v x v,
,
,
,
( )
( )
=
+
+ -
> >
1
1 1
0      (17c) 
h
b a h
bh a
hf q
f q
q u x u,
,
,
,
( )( )
( )
= -
- +
+ -
< <
1 1
1 1
0      (17d) 
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where g  is the exponent on v in the matching function, a is the exponent on j in the matching 
function, and b  is the proportion of searchers who are employed, b f= -( )1 u j .  Note the role of 
employed job search and particularly the sensitivity of this to the job offer rate,hf q, , in influencing 
the dependence of the outflow rate on vacancies.  The larger is hf q, , the lower is the responsiveness 
of the outflow rate to vacancies.   
2.ii  Firms 
 
The basis of firm behaviour is profit maximisation and labour demand.  Labour demand in turn 
depends on wages, capital and demand shocks.  However, recent empirical work on micro labour 
demand, principally the work on job creation and destruction started by Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1990, 1992), has emphasised the importance of idiosyncratic effects on firms’ labour demand.  
This presumably derives in turn from shocks to productivity or the firm’s demand.  We write firm j’s 
planned employment change12 as a function of the aggregate cycle, the wage (w) and factors unique 
to it (x jt): 
 
Dn n wjt
p
t t j t= ( , , )y x         (18) 
 
Davis and Haltiwanger’s work shows the importance of the idiosyncratic component relative 
to the aggregate cycle and wage (and that the role of these may vary with variations in the the cross-
sectional distribution of employment growth).  The firm operates in a dynamic environment, facing 
quits and undertaking hiring and firing to achieve its planned employment growth.  Firms may also 
engage in worker turnover for reasons other than employment growth – churning13.  Each firm will 
then calculate its own optimal hiring and layoff rates as a function of its desired workforce change 
and churning, and anticipated quits.  Firms also set vacancies and adjust their search intensity.  
Vacancy determination is not straightforward; standard models assume firms have at most one job, 
so the simple question for a firm is whether it is worth posting a vacancy or not.  We will assume that 
for a firm with many job slots, vacancies are given by the difference between optimal employment in 
a friction-free environment and current employment (where this is positive) plus anticipated quits.  
This is different from the approach in the standard model, in that the number of vacancies is not 
influenced by the tightness of the labour market, but simply by firms’ labour demand14.   
The firm determines its layoff rate, hiring rate, vacancy rate and search intensity (at least in 
expectation).  Taking the layoff rate first, and using the intertemporal employment identity: 
 
h l n qjt jt jt
p
j t- = +D        (19) 
 
where h, l, and q represent the hiring rate, layoffs rate and quit rate.  Firms may also hire and fire 
simultaneously to adjust the composition of their workforce.  So, the layoff rate for firm j will 
depend on 
 
                                                                 
12 As explained below, this includes the firm’s adjustment for hiring costs; therefore, Dn j t
p will depend on the 
tightness of the labour market, m/v.   
13 This is simultaneous hiring and firing by firms to change the skill mix of their workforces.   
14 Search intensity will be influenced by tightness, but it seems likely that only special cases will yield the result 
that ‘net’ tightness is unaffected by unemployment. 
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l l w qjt j t t t jt= ( , , , )y x        (20) 
 
where we have absorbed the firm-specific element of quits into x jt.  We now need to aggregate 
these individual layoff rates into an aggregate rate.  We know that the importance of the idiosyncratic 
component means that the relation between the layoff rate and the aggregate cycle and quit rate may 
be weak (and mediated by changes in the cross-sectional distribution of employment growth), but 
this does provide a basis for the aggregate layoff rate: 
 
l l w qt t t t nt= ( , , , )y s        (21) 
 
where l  is the average relationship between l jt  and ( , , , )y xt t t jtw q , and snt measures the 
variability of the cross-sectional distribution of employment growth.  This may vary over time in 
accordance with the evidence.   
This study does not focus strongly on wage determination.  We assume that the wage can be 
written as a function of the unemployment rate and the cycle (clearly, we could also allow 
idiosyncratic elements too).  This gives us our aggregate layoff relationship: 
 
l l u qt t t t nt= ( , , , )y s        (22) 
 
Turning to vacancies, as noted above, these are set equal to 
 
 v n qj t jt jt= +max( , )
*0 D       (23) 
 
where Dn j t
*  is the difference between firm j’s optimal employment in a friction-free environment and 
current employment.  Because of the existence of adjustment costs, in this context search intensity 
costs, the firm will not necessarily aim to fill all vacancies immediately.  Thus vacancies will differ 
from hires.  Following the same argument as before we reach an aggregate vacancy equation of the 
form: 
 
v v u qt t t t nt= ( , , , )y s        (24) 
 
This is not dissimilar to a standard vacancy setting equation, though note the role of the quit 
rate here.   
Clearly, a similar procedure would yield an aggregate hiring relationship.  However, we have 
already derived an expression for this as total hires and total matches are the same thing.  These two 
are made consistent through the firm’s choice of search intensity.  This works as follows:  vacancies 
are fixed by the definition that they are ‘real’ jobs, and by labour demand.  The matching function 
gives the firm the relationship between its search intensity expenditure and the speed of hiring, given 
the state of the aggregate labour market.  This provides the firm with the standard adjustment cost 
trade-off to make, and yields the value of Dn jt
p .  The implication is that hiring costs will be lower 
when unemployment is higher and firms will therefore increase their search intensity and generate 
more matches.  The variability of search intensity ensures that the hiring rate derived from the 
matching framework will be consistent with that from the labour demand framework.  For the 
purposes of this paper, it is easier to work with the matching framework. 
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2.iii  Labour market flows 
 
The presence of employed job search provides a feedback channel between vacancies and quits, as 
can be seen by comparing (16) and (24).  High quit rates imply the need for more vacancies to 
replace some portion of those quits:  only some are replaced, as some quits occur from jobs that 
would have been destroyed anyway (this factor also has important implications for the inflow rate – 
see below).  High vacancies in turn lead to high quits through the matching function; an increase in 
vacancies produces a lower increase in quits, however15.  Note that this mutually reinforcing 
structure between vacancies and quits means that any shock to either will have ‘multiplier’ effects.  
Putting together (16) and (24), q and v are jointly determined: 
 
q q u z zt t t nt= ~( , , , , )y s1 2       (25) 
v v u z zt t t nt= ~( , , , , )y s1 2       (26) 
 
Substituting for v in (15), we can write the unemployment outflow rate as: 
 
x x u z zt t t nt= ~( , , , , )y s1 2       (27) 
 
Two important points follow from this.  First, note that factors affecting employed job search 
will influence the unemployment outflow rate.  This widens the set of possible ‘candidates’ for 
explaining long-run changes in duration, and suggests the possibility that such changes may not arise 
from the search behaviour of the unemployed at all.  Factors that might promote job search by the 
employed include falling job-changing costs, widening wage distribution and increased feelings of job 
insecurity.  These factors all encourage more of the employed to engage in job search, thereby 
providing more competition for the unemployed and reducing their success rate16.  This suggests 
potentially fruitful empirical work investigating these links.   
Second, we have a relationship between the outflow rate and the unemployment rate.  
Conditional on vacancies, a rise in unemployment reduces the outflow rate (see 17b).  However, 
vacancies respond to the rise in unemployment because of the complementarity in the matching 
function; if they do not rise sufficiently then the net effect of the rise in unemployment will be that the 
outflow rate falls.  There are a number of reasons why vacancies may not rise enough:  there may be 
decreasing returns to scale in the matching function17, the vacancy setting rule may be such that 
vacancies and firm search intensity do not depend sensitively on labour market tightness18, or the 
operation of competition between employed and unemployed job searchers.  Any effect of 
unemployment on the outflow rate is ruled out in the models of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) by 
their twin assumptions of constant returns in matching and the vacancy setting rule.  The former 
implies that the outflow rate depends only on the U/V ratio.  The latter fixes the U/V ratio equal to a 
constant depending on the value of output19. 
                                                                 
15 We can be sure then that the equilibrium of this pair of equations is stable. 
16 Whilst an exogenous increase in employed job search reduces the outflow rate, it also reduces the inflow rate.   
17 See Burgess and Profit (1998) for some evidence on this for Britain. 
18 Our assumption above that vacancies must reflect ‘real’ jobs ties vacancies down, so in this case it is firms’ 
search intensity that varies with labour market tightness.  There is no reason to believe that search intensity will 
respond sufficiently to yield unchanged job offer rates. 
19 For example, Mortensen (1994, p.  1139) confirms that the model has the property that an increase in job search 
(in his case, an increase in search intensity by the employed) implies that “vacancies respond in proportion to 
offset congestion of this kind”.  See also p.  1124. 
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The flow into unemployment is the lay-off rate plus the rate at which people quit into 
unemployment.  For the purposes of this model, we take the latter as exogenous: 
 
i l u q uqt t t t nt t= +( , , , )y s       (28) 
 
As just noted, the fact that some jobs that would have been destroyed and given rise to 
layoffs do not because workers quit directly into another job, also has an impact on the nature of the 
inflow rate.  Equation (28) shows that the inflow rate is therefore decreasing in the quit rate.  
Combining the quit rate model (25) with (28) for the inflow yields: 
 
i i u z zt t t nt=
~( , , , , )y s1 2       (29) 
 
This has a number of implications.  First, it provides a second channel for the cycle to affect 
the inflow rate, reinforcing the direct effect of the business cycle on labour demand and lay-offs.  
When a negative cyclical shock hits, this raises layoffs and reduces hires; the fall in hires plus the rise 
in unemployment reduce quits.  The lower quits interact with the higher layoff rate to increase the 
inflow rate even more.  Second, in the long run equilibrium, when average employment growth is 
zero, the inflow rate depends on the quit rate and structural factors only.  For a given degree of 
employment heterogeneity, measured by snt, the higher the quit rate, the more firms find they can 
accommodate their desired employment fall without needing layoffs, and hence the lower the inflow 
rate.   
We are finally in a position to put this together to reach our reduced form modelling 
equations.  We assume that snt depends on the cycle and job reallocation factors z3.  Collecting 
together all exogenous factors in Z, we can re-write the inflow and outflow models for estimation as: 
 
i i u Zt t t=
~( , , )y         (30)  
x x u Zt t t= ~( , , )y         (31) 
 
This plus the intertemporal identity is our system. 
 
u u i u u xt t t t t t+ = + - -1 1( )       (32) 
 
(e)  The cyclicality of unemployment flow rates 
 
We can use this framework to analyse the transmission of business cycle shocks to unemployment, 
in particular whether cyclical influences work mainly through the inflow or the outflow.  We compare 
the relative sensitivity of the two flows to the cycle and explain why it is as it is.   
The key finding is as follows.  Suppose that business cycle shocks are symmetric in that 
positive and negative shocks are equally likely and of equal size.  Then, if there is employed job 
search, and if it is sensitive to the job offer arrival rate (f > 0, hf,q > hf q, ), the unemployment flow 
rates will respond asymmetrically.  The inflow rate will be more sensitive to the cycle than the 
outflow rate and the difference between them increases as hf,q  increases20.   
                                                                 
20 See Burgess (1994). 
12  
The intuition for this is straightforward and follows that given in Section (2a).  Suppose there 
is a boom, raising the demand for labour.  More firms offer vacancies and the chance of finding a 
job increases.  However, this is offset for the unemployed by the externality imposed by the 
decisions of some of the employed to engage in job search, thus attenuating the impact of the higher 
vacancies.  This means that the effect of the boom on the unemployment outflow rate is reduced, 
and it will be more reduced the more important and sensitive is employed job search.  Turning to the 
inflow, the boom means that fewer firms will need to reduce their workforces.  Of those that do, 
because of higher job-to-job quits out of the firm, more can do so through natural wastage and 
fewer will need to fire workers, reducing the inflow21.  It also means that, of those who are fired, 
more can find new jobs without actually entering unemployment.  These two additional channels 
mean that the effect of the boom on the inflow is exaggerated.  Again, the more important 
endogenous employed job search is, the more sensitive is the inflow to the cycle.   
We investigate these issues empirically below.  First, we simply ask whether changes in 
unemployment arise principally through the outflow, or through the inflow or both.  That is, taking the 
cyclical or secular factors as shocks, we investigate the data assuming the system x ut t xt= +p e1 , 
i ut t it= +p e2 plus the intertemporal identity (32).  Second, we estimate models (30) and (31) to 
evaluate the sensitivity of i and x to the cycle and unemployment. 
 
 
3.  Data 
 
We use quarterly data on the unemployment stock and flows from 1967 to 1999.  The data refer to 
claimant unemployment.  Some series we use relate just to men, some to both men and women 
together.  Comprehensive details of the construction of the dataset are given in Burgess and Turon 
(1999); and see also Burgess (1993) from which the earlier data are taken.  We also illustrate some 
arguments using disaggregate data on Travel-to-work areas (TTWAs).  These are described below.  
Note that these are ‘real’ inflows (people registering at the very start of their unemployment spell), 
not the stock in the shortest duration band as some authors are forced to do by data constraints 
(Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant, 1985, 1986; Abbring et al, 1997).  There are a number of other 
data issues to discuss. 
First, our timing convention is that inflows and outflows labelled t are the flows that occur 
during the period t.  The quarterly stock dated t corresponds to the stock at the beginning of the 
period t.  Thus the stock-flow identity is:  U U I Xt t t t+ = + -1 .   
Second, the consistency of the time series needs to be checked.  This has two aspects.  
First, the data show a discrepancy between the change in unemployment stock and the difference 
between inflows and outflows.  This is acknowledged in the data documentation:  “The figures for 
off-flows are not considered to be as complete as those for on-flows.  A more accurate count of 
off-flows can be obtained by .... adding the stock at the beginning of the period to the total in-flows 
recorded during the period then subtracting the stock at the end of the period” (NOMIS Datasets 
guide, July 1995).  This presumably arises from clerical (non-computerised) claims.  By the end of 
the period, the discrepancy is a trivial fraction of the inflow, but in the late 1980s it amounts to 10% 
of the inflow.  The pattern in the discrepancy does not appear to bear any particular relationship to 
                                                                 
21 This is carrying through the assumption of no correlation between employment growth rates and quit rates at 
firm level.  Such a correlation would weaken or strengthen this argument depending on whether it was negative 
or positive. 
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the business cycle.  We create a consistent outflow series from the inflow and stock series and the 
stock-flow identity.  Second, the flow series are not adjusted for changes in the definition of 
unemployment; this is one of the unavoidable drawbacks of using administrative data.  This is 
unfortunate, but these are the only flow data available, and are used by all researchers in the field.  
The two major changes were in October 1982 and April to August 1983.  While an adjusted stock 
series has been produced, this obviously cannot be used to adjust the flows without further 
information; since it is important for the analysis that we have flows and stock series consistent with 
each other, we have used the stock series that links the flows.  In fact, there has been relatively little 
disruption to the series since 1986, the period our estimation covers.   
Third, data on other variables such as employment and the labour force are also derived 
from the Employment Gazette (now Labour Market Trends) and latterly from NOMIS.  
Employment includes all over the age of 16 in employment as an employee, self-employed or on 
work-related government programmes.  These data are also collected for all and for males only22.  
Series for labour force are obtained by adding total unemployment and male unemployment to these 
employment series.  All this data is unadjusted for seasonal variation. 
Turning to the disaggregate data, we chose a travel-to-work area level of disaggregation as 
this offers a good approximation to a self-contained labour market.  Each TTWA meets the 
following criteria:  a minimum working population of 3500, 75% of those living in the area should 
also work there; 75% of those working in the area should also live there.  We use Jobcentre best-fit 
TTWAs; there are 310 such areas in Great Britain.  Unemployment stocks and flows have been 
extracted at the Jobcentre best-fit travel-to-work area level (ttwa84jc) from the NOMIS dataset 
UFP, quarterly23. 
Finally, in Table 1 we offer a brief description of the main series of interest.  We see that on 
average about 1m individuals become unemployed every quarter and about the same number leave 
unemployment.  Both series exhibit considerable variability over the horizon, moving between 
minima of about 0.68m per quarter to maxima of about 1.4m.  These numbers can be contrasted 
with an average unemployment stock of about 1.72m.  The unemployment flow rates are also 
presented, both relative to the labour force and relative to the relevant stock variable – 
unemployment for the outflow rate and employment for the inflow24.  Expressing the inflow as a 
fraction of the employed shows that on average about 4% become unemployed each quarter, 
varying between 5.6% and 2.6%.  Note that the unemployment outflow rate cannot be thought of 
strictly as a probability as for some dates it exceeds unity.  Clearly the true outflow rate cannot 
exceed one:  in the early years of the sample with relatively low unemployment, the pool ‘at risk’ of 
leaving unemployment increased during the quarter by the inflow to such an extent relative to the 
initial stock that more people left the state than occupied it at the beginning of the period.  So this 
problem arises because of the use of quarterly data. 
                                                                 
22 To get data on male employment, some assumptions have had to be made as the disaggregation by sex is not 
available for all the components of the working population – see Burgess and Turon (1999). 
23 There is no employment data at the ttwa84jc  level after 1991.  However, the dataset UBRD provides data on 
labour force for all and for males only at the ttwa84 level, on a yearly basis.  This data refers to employees in 
employment plus unemployment plus self-employed plus armed forces plus participants in work-related schemes.  
The 310 TTWAs at the ttwa84jc level correspond to either one or the addition of two or three TTWAs at the 
ttwa84 level.  There are generally only small discrepancies between the ttwa84 and the ttwa84jc  level 
breakdowns.  Given this, and the fact that there simply is no data for employment available at the ttwa84jc level, 
we take labour force data at the ttwa84 level and use this to approximate the ttwa84jc level. 
24 Note that not all of the inflow come from employment, so the exactly appropriate denominator would also 
include some inactive.   
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4.  Facts on Unemployment, Flows and the Cycle 
 
We begin by exploring the cyclical and secular properties of the three inter-related series, x, i and u.  
The intertemporal accounting identity can be expressed in levels (and given our timing conventions) 
as:  DU I Xt t t= -- -1 1 , or in flow rates as: 
 
[ ]u i u i xt t t t t t= + - - +- - - -1 1 1 11 1( ( )) u      (33) 
 
where i I L U x X U L L Lt t t t t t t t t t t= - = = - - -/ ( ), / , ( ) /u 1 1 .  The dependence of i() and x() on u 
and the cycle is behavioural and is the focus of interest.  We first ask whether inflow shocks or 
outflow shocks contribute more to explaining movements in unemployment, controlling for the 
endogeneity of the flows themselves.  We first present graphical analysis and then back this up with 
more formal econometric analysis. 
 
(a)  Graphical analysis 
 
Figure 3 presents smoothed versions (5-quarter moving averages) of the unemployment flows, for all 
workers and separately for men.  There is no strong overall trend in the flows:  the figures are at the 
same level in 1987 as they were in 1967.  The figure also presents the unemployment stock data.  
From the perspective of 1987 the picture looked very bleak with record levels of unemployment 
having persisted for a number of years.  Twelve years on, we have seen unemployment fall more 
rapidly than could have seemed possible then, only to rise again almost as rapidly and fall back once 
more. 
These figures embody one of the key points of the paper.  Over the period as a whole, the 
inflow leads the outflow through the cycle.  This is particularly marked since the early 1980s:  the 
inflow clearly precedes the outflow by about a year.  The pattern is remarkable:  a very good 
approximation to the unemployment outflow over the last two decades is simply the inflow a year 
previously25.  The figures also clearly show that the pattern is if anything stronger using the data on 
males only.   
It is important to be clear that this need not be so, that this picture is informative.  We can 
certainly write the outflow as an identity in terms of past inflows:  unemployment exits at t are simply 
the sum of exits of all durations, s, at that date, X t X t s
s
( ) ( , )=
=
¥
å
0
, where X(t, s) denotes outflows at 
time t of workers unemployed for duration s.  X(t, s) in turn is given by the number becoming 
unemployed t - s periods ago, multiplied by the chance that they have remained unemployed for s 
periods, and then have left unemployment in t.  We can therefore write total outflows as: 
                                                                 
25 Over the period 1981:1 to 1998:4, the inflow lagged a year by itself explains 58% of the movement in the 
outflow, with no other explanatory variables.  Including inflow lagged 5 and 6 quarters raises this to 71%.  To 
emphasise, these results require no lagged outflow terms.  In fact, the representation of the outflow as a function 
of the inflow lagged a year only is robust statistically – showing negligible serial correlation, no 
heteroskedasticity and few signs of parameter non-constancy.  This is quite a remarkable result for a 
macroeconomic model covering 71 quarters with just one explanatory variable. 
15  
X t I t s x t s x t i s i
s i
s
( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ( , ))= - - - -
=
¥
=
-
å Õ
0 0
1
1   
where x t s( , ) is the exit rate out of unemployment.  But this is only going to imply the picture we see 
if the outflow rate is relatively constant; relative, that is, to the movements in the inflow.  This is 
exactly the point we are illustrating here.  If the outflow rate was highly variable, and was the channel 
through which shocks to unemployment were mostly transmitted, then this would imply that the 
outflow X(t) did not simply follow inflows I(t)26. 
It is also interesting to note that the behaviour of the flows appears different before and after 
1980 (this is before the main breaks in the data arising from definitional changes).  Before that, we 
can characterise the graphs as showing that the inflow was highly cyclical but that the outflow 
appeared to be largely acyclical and slightly related to the inflow.  After that period, the behaviour 
was different and the relationship between inflow and outflow much stronger. 
We now look at the unemployment flow rates.  It turns out that the choice of normalising 
variable is crucial to the interpretation of the process of unemployment dynamics.  There appear to 
be two main choices.  Clearly, normalising by the labour force (as Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant, 
1986, do for US data) will produce no meaningful change as in the UK the labour force has 
changed little, and any denominator common to both series will leave the picture unchanged.  
However, we can define the inflow rate as the numbers becoming unemployed relative to the 
employed population27, and the outflow rate as the number leaving relative to the stock.  These are 
shown in Figure 4, alongside the unemployment rate. 
Again two very striking features are apparent.  First, the inflow rate appears to be at least as 
important as the outflow rate in generating changes in unemployment.  Second, the picture looks 
different either side of 1980.  Before that date, the unemployment outflow rate was highly correlated 
with the unemployment rate – indeed, given the relatively acyclical nature of the outflow noted above 
in this period, the outflow rate is largely the mirror image of the unemployment rate.  Afterwards, 
though the unemployment rate is more variable than in the earlier period, the outflow rate reacts 
much less:  the standard deviation of the latter in 1967 – 1980 is 0.5674, and in 1981 – 1998 is 
0.0825.  The inflow by contrast is somewhat more variable over the latter period:  a standard 
deviation of 0.0076 compared to 0.0040 before 1980.  The picture also suggests that in the latter 
period the inflow rate is more variable and more closely correlated with unemployment than is the 
outflow rate, though this impression is misleading because of the split scale of the figure.  In fact, 
taking the standard deviation relative to the mean shows that the inflow and outflow rates are about 
equally variable since 1981. 
We noted above that because of time aggregation, the outflow rate is not straightforward to 
interpret as it cannot be thought of strictly as a probability.  We can partially correct for this by 
taking as the denominator the beginning of period stock plus half the inflow28.  The result of doing 
this is in Figure 5.  There is quite a substantial effect in the early period when the inflow is high 
relative to the stock and roughly halves the extent of the decline in the measured outflow rate. 
We now turn to the flow and stock data at TTWA level, observed over a window of 159 
months.  Since it would be difficult to present results for all 310 TTWAs, we present results for the 
largest 12 areas (in terms of the labour force).  In Figure 6a we graph the smoothed inflow and 
outflows for these 12 areas.  The inflow leads the outflow in most of these areas – see for example, 
                                                                 
26 Simulations with a highly cyclical outflow rate show a different picture to that shown in Figure 3. 
27 Again, this is ignoring the fact that a lot of people enter unemployment from inactivity. 
28 This assumes a constant flow within the period. 
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Birmingham, Bristol, Heathrow, London and Manchester.  It is interesting to note that in the 
depressed labour markets of Glasgow, Liverpool and Newcastle there is much less time series 
variability in the flows.  Figure 6b graphs the flow rates.  Note that the relative vertical position of the 
two curves is meaningless as the two lines are drawn to different scales.  What is clear is the 
negative correlation between the two rates.  This parallels the aggregate findings (see Figure 4, 
though the scale obscures it somewhat).   
The figures displayed above suggest an important role for variation in the unemployment 
inflow in generating unemployment changes.  However, the widely-held view is that in fact changes 
in the outflow rate or average duration drive unemployment dynamics.  We can see the basis for that 
view in two other graphs.  First, Figure 7 plots the proportion of unemployed who have been out of 
work for a year or more – one measure of duration – alongside the unemployment rate.  The two 
are clearly closely related, whereas as we know the inflow rate is not trended upward.  For 
example, comparing the unemployment rate in 1975 of 3.3% with that of 11.6% in 1985, the inflow 
rate is virtually unchanged between the two dates at 4.2% (1975) and 4.8% (1985) whereas the 
long-term unemployment proportion doubles from 19.2% to 38.0%.  The second graph, Figure 8, 
works from the equilibrium identity u* = 1/(1 + x/i), and decomposes the evolution of x/i into x and 
i.  It is clear that the movement of x/i is dominated by the movement of x, the outflow rate.  This has 
supported the view that it is changes in the outflow rate that has been primarily responsible for the 
changes in unemployment.  However, three factors show that this line of argument is flawed.  First, 
the inflow and outflow levels are of very similar size.  However, when we create the flow rates, we 
divide the outflow by unemployment and the inflow by employment, a number over twelve times 
bigger.  It is therefore unsurprising and uninformative to see that the ratio of the two flows is largely 
driven by variations in the outflow rate.  Changes in the inflow rate that are an order of magnitude 
smaller than than changes in the outflow rate will have the same effect on unemployment.  Second, 
Figure 5 shows that once time aggregation is accounted for, some of the correlation of x and u is 
lost.  Third, once we allow for the possibility that the outflow rate depends on the unemployment 
rate, this correlation clearly tells us nothing about causation.  Movements in the outflow rate are 
endogenous and thus the co-movement of the outflow rate and the unemployment rate may not 
provide evidence that changes in the former have led to changes in the latter29.  Over the early 
period to 1980, outflows trended downwards with little cyclicality and the movement in the outflow 
rate is derived from the movement in the unemployment rate itself.  Over the later period, outflows 
appear to be driven by inflows.  See below for the econometric evidence for this.   
(b)  Variance decompositions and VAR analysis 
 
In an attempt to make sense of the graphical results, we employ a number of more formal 
techniques.  There are two issues that have to be dealt with in evaluating these:  the possible 
dependence of the flow rates on each other, and on the unemployment rate, and the fact that the 
intertemporal accounting identity relating the stock and the flows is non-linear.   
4.i  Variance decomposition 
 
                                                                 
29 This is not a reprise of the argument between Price (1985) and Nickell (1985) over whether it is better to model 
the number leaving unemployment, X, or the outflow rate, x.  Rather, the argument is that the outflow rate has a 
behavioural dependence on unemployment which, if it had an elasticity close to –1, will generate a relatively flat 
outflow series. 
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The procedure we report in this section takes account of the non-linearity but not of the 
endogeneity.  The technique is as follows:  we set the unemployment rate at its initial value, and then 
simulate it forwards using the accounting identity (33).  We first use the actual inflow rate but a 
constant outflow rate (equal to the sample average).  This produces a synthetic unemployment 
history30.  We then regress the actual unemployment rate on this synthetic series and note the R2 as a 
measure of how much that constant outflow rate series explains.  We repeat the procedure using an 
unemployment rate generated using a constant inflow rate.  A comparison of these R2 values is then 
an indicator of how much the inflow and outflow rates respectively explain. 
The results are in Table 2.  This table makes it strikingly clear how important the distinction 
is between outflows normalised by the labour force and normalised by the unemployment stock.  
Taking the former the inflow-constant explains 9% and the  outflow-constant explains 50% of the 
variation in unemployment.  On the other hand, using the outflow rate defined by the unemployment 
stock, the inflow-constant explains 92% of the variation compared to just 3% in an outflow-rate 
constant model.  Repeating this analysis using an outflow rate adjusted for time aggregation shows 
no real difference.  The table also reports changes in this statistic over time.  Looking first at the 
rates defined by the labour force, we see that the relative explanatory power of the inflow rate has 
declined over time.  This is explicable by looking again at Figure 4.  We know that the behaviour of 
the outflows changed over time to more closely reflect the inflows after 1980.  Thus in the last three 
sub-periods, the outflows are largely reflecting the lagged inflow rate.  We would argue therefore 
that the real influence of the inflow has not in fact declined over the period.   
Using the rates defined by the relevant stocks, we see further evidence of the change around 
1980.  As expected, relative to the unemployment rate normalised by the unemployment stock, the 
inflow rate explains none of the movement in unemployment until 1980.  From then, however, and 
even using this outflow rate, the inflow rate explains about half of the variations in unemployment.  
Again, the basis for this can be seen in Figure 4.  To repeat, this approach takes note of the non-
linearity but not the potential endogeneity of the outflow rate.   
 
4.ii  VAR analysis with variance decomposition 
 
Our preferred analysis is derived from a VAR (Vector Autoregression), combined with the same 
sort of variance decomposition just reported.  This deals with both the endogeneity of the flow rates 
and the inherent non-linearity in the process.  To construct the VAR we regress both the inflow and 
outflow rates (defined on the employment and unemployment stocks respectively) on twelve lags of 
each (plus a constant and seasonal dummies): 
x L x L i
i L x L i
t x t x t t
x
t i t i t t
i
= + +
= + +
- -
- -
a b e
a b e
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
     (34) 
Since the intertemporal unemployment identity shows that unemployment can be written as a 
complex function of all past inflow and outflow rates, we can also think of this as regressing the 
flows on lagged unemployment rates.  The coefficients are not presented here.  This regression was 
run over the whole period.  Given what we have seen before, this will tend to downplay the effect of 
the inflow rate.  This procedure isolates the residuals and these can be identified with the original 
shocks or innovations driving the inflow and outflow rates.  The coefficient estimates then track how 
                                                                 
30 We tried following the work of Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant (1986) for the US in performing variance 
decompositions on this series but the covariances were so large and often negative that the results were difficult 
to interpret.  Instead we adopted the following procedure. 
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both rates respond to both these initial shocks.  So this approach captures the reaction of the 
outflow rate to the shock in the inflow rate (and vice versa).   
We can compute the expected inflow and outflow rates as functions of the innovations, 
$($ , $ ), $($ , $ )i xt
i
t
x
t
i
t
xe e e e .  We can then use these to compute a synthetic unemployment series, setting 
to zero in turn the inflow innovation series and the outflow innovation series31.  This is a more 
sophisticated procedure than in the previous section because it is not the flow series itself that is held 
constant, but one source of shocks to it.   
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   (35) 
This gives us two synthetic unemployment histories.  We simply regress the actual 
unemployment history on these in turn and report the R2s in Table 3.  We find that over the period 
as a whole, we can explain 85% of the movements in unemployment without using the outflow 
innovations.  Conversely, we can only explain 43% if we turn off the inflow innovation series.  If we 
simply look at the period since 1979, we find that the outflow shocks explain essentially none of the 
changes in unemployment.  We also repeat the procedure using the outflow series adjusted for time 
aggregation issues; the results are equally emphatic that the inflow innovations explain far more of the 
movements in unemployment, and almost solely so since 1979.   
We also regress unemployment on both synthetic histories together and examine the 
coefficients.  This can be thought of as being in the spirit of a Davidson-MacKinnon J-test.  We find 
a coefficient on the no-inflow-shock history of 0.244 (s.e.  of 0.049), and on the no-outflow shock 
of 0.826 (s.e.  of 0.040).  This suggests that taken jointly the inflow shocks matter more for 
unemployment dynamics. 
One further point is of interest here, relating to the break in the time series.  If we estimate 
these regressions using recursive least squares, we can check for changes in the value of the 
estimated coefficient over time.  These are displayed in Figure 9 for the series with only inflow 
shocks, and the series for only outflow shocks.  The key result is that the outflow rate equation 
shows a great deal of significant change around the time early/mid 1980s.  It is true, as Table 3 
suggests that shocks to the outflow rate are more important in the 1970s and largely irrelevant since 
then.  This further reinforces the view espoused earlier that the dynamics of unemployment, 
particularly the outflow, change around that date.   
Finally we can look at the implied response of unemployment to an inflow shock and to an 
outflow shock.  Figure 10 shows the impact of a one-off shock to each flow rate (of size one 
standard-deviation), tracked over 16 quarters.  The central estimate is shown with standard error 
bands.  We see that there is a significant initial effect of the inflow rate on the outflow rate.  There 
appears to be no reverse effect.  We can use these simulated inflow and outflow rates to compute 
the implied unemployment rate.  This allows the inflow rate shock to influence the unemployment 
rate both through its direct effect and through its effect on the outflow rate.  Thus the endogeneity of 
the outflow rate is dealt with.  Note, though, that it does not allow any feedback from lagged 
unemployment to the outflow or inflow rates.  We compute the unemployment rate via the 
                                                                 
31 This would be problematic if the two series were highly correlated.  In fact, the contemporaneous correlation is 
0.21, against a 5% significance level of 0.19, and correlations at all other lags are insignificant.  Using an SVAR 
we could force the orthogonality of the structural errors, but this is rendered a non-trivial undertaking by the 
nonlinear intertemporal identity at the heart of the model.  Also, given the reduced form nature of this section, it 
is not clear that an SVAR is appropriate. 
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accounting identity (starting at an initial unemployment rate of 8%):  this therefore takes account of 
the non-linearity in the unemployment process.  The results are shown in Figure 11.  The differential 
impact of the two shocks is quite striking32.  The inflow rate shock has almost twice the impact of 
the outflow rate shock, peaking at an unemployment rate of 9.45% - a 15.3% proportionate 
increase.  Note also that the effect is more immediate than that of the outflow shock. 
We can now summarise the key features of the data that we have highlighted.  First, the 
graphs show that the inflow series leads the outflow series with a lag of around one year.  Second, it 
matters whether one investigates outflows normalised by the labour force, or outflows normalised by 
the unemployment stock, and a significantly different picture appears when we look at the latter.  
Comparisons of the latter outflow rate with the inflow rate in relation to the evolution of equilibrium 
unemployment appear to show that the outflow rate is more important in generating the latter than is 
the inflow rate.  Third, we argue that the way these two facts can be understood together is if the 
unemployment outflow rate is endogenous, if it is itself influenced by the unemployment rate.  So the 
model we propose is one in which inflows are driven by the cycle and lead outflows; this changes 
unemployment, which in turn has feedback effects on the flow rates.  This endogenous response of 
outflow (duration), plus the denominator issue mentioned plus time aggregation explain much of the 
apparent importance of the outflow rate in Figure 8.  Finally, the relationship between the stock and 
flow rates appears to change sometime around 1980. 
 
 
5.  Estimation 
 
The next step is to estimate models for the inflow and outflow rates as functions of the 
unemployment stock, the business cycle and secular features.  However, this is complicated by the 
fact that several factors can induce cyclicality in the measured aggregate outflow rate even if the 
underlying outflow rate is acyclical.  Thus we need to isolate a measure of the ‘core’ outflow rate.  
We describe this induced cyclicality, a method to deal with it and the results. 
 
(a)  Induced cyclicality in the outflow rate  
 
It is easy to see why duration dependence in the unemployment outflow rate, or heterogeneity in the 
flow into unemployment may induce cyclicality in the average measured outflow rate33.  Consider a 
model with a cycle in the inflow rate, and an outflow rate process that is independent of the cycle but 
for each (identical) individual declines over duration.  Suppose that the recently unemployed have a 
high chance of finding a job, but that the long term unemployed have a negligible chance.  In this 
case, the average measured outflow rate depends on the duration structure of the unemployment 
stock, and this in turn depends on the movement in the inflow.  As the economy turns down, more 
people flow in, the ratio of newly unemployed increases and hence so does the average outflow rate:  
induced counter-cyclicality.   
                                                                 
32 There are technical issues arising from the use of a VAR in the construction of impulse response functions.  In 
particular the orthogonal decomposition of the error terms has to attribute any joint component to one or the 
other of the series.  Traditionally this is just attributed arbitrarily to the first series in the list.  Therefore, ordering 
matters.  In this particular case, there does not appear to be a sizeable joint component in the residuals; in any 
case we have placed the outflow rate first in the list so any joint component is attributed to the outflow. 
33 See Burgess and Turon (1999) for a demonstration using simulation. 
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Turning to heterogeneity, suppose that there are two sorts of workers with high (H) and low (L) 
chances of finding a job.  The ‘weeding out’ phenomenon will ensure a higher proportion of good 
searchers – and hence a higher exit rate – when the inflow has just risen.  So this will induce 
counter-cyclical variation in the exit rate.  Suppose further that the inflow quality is pro-cyclical so 
that in a boom, the inflow is composed of more H workers and fewer L workers.  In this case, the 
average exit rate will be higher in a boom simply as the result of better quality searchers:  pro-
cyclical heterogeneity exaggerates the pro-cyclicality of the measured exit rate.  This is the finding of 
Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant (1985) and Abbring, van den Berg and van Ours (1997) for the US.  
Alternatively, if the inflow quality is counter-cyclical then the pro-cyclicality of the measured exit rate 
underestimates the truth.  This is the case proposed by Turon (2000) for the UK.  All these cases 
show why we need to control for duration dependence and heterogeneity to isolate the underlying 
‘core’ outflow rate. 
 
(b)  Estimating duration dependence and heterogeneity 
 
A technique for separately identifying duration dependence and heterogeneity has been proposed by 
van den Berg and van Ours (1994, 1996) using aggregate data; this has also been used by Abbring, 
van den Berg and van Ours (1995, 1997).  We use their technique, extended to take account of 
cyclical variation in the inflow quality (see Turon, 2000).  The main assumption of their model is that 
the influences of the business cycle, duration of unemployment, and individual characteristics (all 
unobserved) are separable.  Individual hazard rates can hence be written as in a simple mixed 
proportional hazard framework: 
 
q m j( , , ) ( ) ( )t s v t s v= × ×        (36) 
 
where s is the elapsed duration of the unemployment spell, t the calendar time and v represents 
unobserved heterogeneity between the unemployed in terms of their ability to find a job.  The 
distribution of v is G(v).  The term m(t) is not a direct function of time but represents the influence of 
the cycle on individual hazard rate.  In other words, it is the ‘core’ outflow rate that we are to 
isolate. 
Whereas van den Berg and Ours (1994, 1996) assumed a constant inflow composition, we 
allow it to vary with the cycle and incorporate a fourth term to the above expression (see also 
Abbring et al (1997) for another approach): 
 
q m j p( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )t s v t s t s v= × × - ×       (37) 
 
The strength of this method is that no parametric assumption is needed for the duration 
dependence pattern j(s) or the heterogeneity distribution G(v)34.  Lancaster(1979) showed that any 
parametric assumption on these would render the results unreliable, particularly with respect to the 
duration dependence phenomenon.  However, we give a parametric form to the inflow composition 
variations35: 
 
p l a( ) [ ( )]t s u t s- = -        (38) 
                                                                 
34 Turon (2000) discusses identification issues. 
35 Experimenting with various functional forms showed that the results were robust. 
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The ratio of average exit rates from different duration bands d1 and d2 at the same calendar 
time t can then be expressed as the product of two ratios, representing the duration and inflow 
composition effects between these two duration bands, times the ratio of the mean of the 
heterogeneity distribution of individuals still unemployed after d1 periods at time t to the mean of the 
heterogeneity distribution of individuals still unemployed after d2 periods at time t.  The term m(t) 
therefore conveniently disappears in the process.  This ‘core’ outflow rate is hence not estimated 
directly but (as shown in the Appendix) it is easy to retrieve it once the other parameters have been 
estimated.  Some algebra shows that the ratios of average exit rates take the form of non-linear 
expressions shown in the Appendix and allow us to estimate features of the duration dependence 
pattern and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution as the following six parameters.  Three 
duration dependence coefficients (the h’s, where hi represents the effect of duration on exit rates 
between the ith and (i+1)th quarter of unemployment),  and three heterogeneity coefficients (the g  
coefficients which represent the second, third and fourth moments of the heterogeneity distribution).  
Three seasonal coefficients representing the impact of each quarter on the heterogeneity distribution 
(the w coefficients) are also estimated, as well as the coefficient a, which informs us whether the 
inflow composition varies pro- or counter-cyclically36. 
For the model to be applicable, the periodicity at which the data are collected has to equal 
the size of the duration class.  The data used have been obtained from NOMIS and cover the 
period from October 1985 to April 1999.  They refer to quarterly stocks of unemployed males, 
broken down by duration groups for the first five quarters of unemployment spells. 
These results are reported in Table 4.  The estimated h coefficients suggest some significant 
negative duration dependence, whereby individuals loose 22% of their chances of finding a job after 
the first quarter of unemployment, another 9% after the second quarter, and yet another 9% after the 
third quarter.  The estimated g2 coefficient suggests a very small or zero variance of the 
heterogeneity distribution, which means that the size of the weeding out process must be small.  The 
positive value of the estimate of a suggests that there is some substantial variation in the inflow 
composition and that the inflow is on average of a better quality (in terms of people’s ability to find a 
job) in times of high unemployment than in times of low unemployment.  With our estimated value of 
a, we can infer that when unemployment is at its highest, at about 12%, people entering 
unemployment have, on average, an ability to find a job in the next period which is 50% better 
(ceteris paribus) than people in the inflow pool at the time of lowest unemployment (about 6%).  
This is a significant departure from the assumption of constant inflow composition.  This comparison 
refers to innate ability to find a job, linked with individual characteristics of workers entering 
unemployment.   
From our results, we can estimate the “core” outflow rate, i.e.  the influence of business 
cycle alone on the individual exit rate, the term m(t) in the hazard rate specification (details of this 
procedure are in the Appendix).  Note that the estimated core outflow rate is more responsive to the 
cycle than would have been the case if we had assumed a constant inflow composition. 
 
 
 
(c)  Inflow and outflow rate estimation 
 
                                                                 
36 The coefficient l in the expression of y(t) is not identified. 
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We now turn to an empirical implementation of the model set out above for the inflow and core 
outflow37.  As explanatory variables, we use the business cycle, the unemployment rate, and time 
trends to capture other secular factors.  Our business cycle measure is based on a constant price 
GDP series; we fit a trend to this using the Hodrick-Prescott filter and use the residuals as a measure 
of the cycle. 
Given the use of the core outflow rate from the previous section, we are restricted to a 
relatively short sample of 52 observations.  This suggests that tests of integration and cointegration 
may have low power.  While fundamentally the unemployment rate “must” be I(0) over a long 
enough historical period38, in this sample window we cannot reject the hypothesis that it is I(1).  
Similarly, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the inflow rate, outflow rate and cycle are I(1), though 
the latter in particular is only borderline.  We then ran Johansen tests for cointegration.  In order to 
avoid the issues around cointegration in the presence of a nonlinear intertemporal identity, we ran 
these tests over two groups of three variables:  first, the outflow rate, the unemployment rate and the 
cycle; and second, the inflow rate, the unemployment rate and the cycle.  In both cases, we found a 
single cointegrating vector.  This result, coupled with the results of Stock (1987) and Banerjee et al 
(1997) that in small samples a one-step estimator has less bias than the Engle-Granger two-step 
approach, we estimate the reduced forms directly. 
The main results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  The unemployment rate is the beginning-
of-period value, and the flows (both inflow and outflow) are within-period flows.  Even so, we test 
for and reject the hypothesis that the unemployment rate is endogenous in both inflow and outflow 
equations.  Taking the inflow rate in Table 5 first, we find that both the cycle and the unemployment 
rate have an effect.  A negative cyclical shock raises the inflow, and higher rates of unemployment 
have both a transient and permanent positive effect on the level of the inflow.  We discuss the 
interpretation of these results below.  There is no role for time trends in the equation:  the exclusion 
of a simple linear trend and of a quadratic in time can be easily accepted.  The equation appears to 
fit the data well.  There is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals, nor of ARCH effects.  
There is also no evidence of parameter instability over this period.  An example Chow breakpoint 
test is presented in the Table, and a fuller analysis using recursive techniques in Figure 12.  We 
tested for interaction terms between the cycle and unemployment and, perhaps surprisingly,  found 
none.   
The core outflow rate estimation is presented in Table 6.  The cycle has a transiently positive 
effect on this, and the unemployment rate has a depressing effect.  There is evidence here of 
dynamics with both the first and second lags of the dependent variable proving significant.  Again, 
time trends are insignificant.  There is also no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals, nor 
ARCH nor heteroskedasticity.  There was however, evidence of parameter instability, which is dealt 
with by including a (0, 1) dummy taking the value unity after 1996:1.  This is likely to be related to 
new policies for the unemployed coming in then or shortly after.   
One potential objection to the results in Table 6 is that the unemployment variable on the 
right hand side is endogenous (despite the evidence of the test).  Stating the point more broadly, one 
of the key arguments of this paper is that the correlation between the unemployment rate and the 
outflow rate derives, at least in part, from a behavioural relationship of the former influencing the 
latter, and not just the outflow rate driving unemployment through the accounting identity.  To 
                                                                 
37 Other empirical models of the flows for Britain include Nickell (1982), Junankar and Price (1983), Pissarides 
(1986) (outflow only), Burgess (1992, 1993, 1994); also see Burda and Wyplosz (1994), Blanchard and Diamond 
(1989, 1990).   
38 On the grounds that it cannot logically be outside (0,1), and historically has rarely been outside (0.02, 0.20). 
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establish this, we rerun the regression in Table 6 using reduced form forcing variables for 
unemployment.  The results are in Table 7; note that we did not engage in any further specification 
search.  First, we simply use the lagged inflow rate and show that this significantly influences the core 
outflow rate39.  The rest of the equation continues to fit well (there is evidence of heteroskedasticity, 
so we report heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics).  Second, we use annually cumulated inflow 
innovations, the innovations being derived from the VAR estimated in Section 4.  This variable 
measures the inflow shocks that we argue drive unemployment and would seem likely to be 
exogenous for the core outflow rate.  It thus provides a good test for this issue.  The results show 
that this also has a significant effect on the core outflow, with the rest of the equation continuing to fit 
well.  These two regressions give good grounds for arguing that the relationship estimated in Table 6 
does not simply reflect the accounting identity, and that there is an important causal component40.   
We can interpret these results in the light of the model set out above.  The negative impact of 
the cyclical variable on the inflow rate reflects the effect of a downturn in labour demand on layoffs.  
More firms find that they have to reduce their workforce as demand falls.  It also has a secondary 
effect:  the lower hiring rates reduce the scope for quits, which in turn means that more of the 
employment reduction at a specific firm has to be accomplished by layoffs.  The influence of 
unemployment exacerbates this:  higher unemployment also reduces the job offer rate, hence further 
reduces quits and raises layoffs and the unemployment inflow.  This effect of unemployment clearly 
outweighs any counter-acting effect of wages on labour demand and layoffs.  The effect of both the 
cycle and the unemployment rate on the outflow rate arise through a combination of job matching 
and job competition.  In a boom, more firms engage in more hiring, raising the job offer rate.  This is 
partially offset by an increase in job search by the employed raising the number of job seekers along 
with the number of job offers.  Indeed, we find that the cyclical variable only has a transient effect on 
the outflow rate.  This suggests that, holding all else constant, the numbers of workers engaging in 
employed job search varies to keep the offer probability roughly constant as the number of new 
hires changes.  The role of unemployment is similar:  this influences both the number of offers made, 
through the matching technology, and the share of these going to the unemployed, through the job 
competition process.  The net effect of a rise in unemployment is to reduce the offer rate. 
We can relate these results back to the analysis of Section 2.  Setting the cycle to zero and 
incorporating the lags to get a long run solution we calculate the empirical counterparts to equations 
(6) and (7):  x* = 0.64 – 2.09u*, i* = 0.03 + 0.17u*.  These imply equilibrium unemployment rates 
of u1* = 9.4% and u2* = 16.7% for the period 1986 - 1998.  Recall that the higher equilibrium rate 
is of interest really only as a way of defining the range of slow adjustment.  Thus shocks pushing 
unemployment into the range 14% - 16% are likely to be long lasting.   
 
 
6.  Simulations 
 
In this section we illustrate the main points of this paper using simulations based on our estimation 
results. 
 
                                                                 
39 Note that the inflow effects are not due to duration or composition effects as these have been purged from the 
raw outflow rate by our use of the core outflow rate. 
40 If instead we include the unemployment rate and instrument it with these two variables, the unemployment rate 
remains significant with a t-statisitic of 2.7. 
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(a)  Calculating equilibrium unemployment 
 
The unemployment rate is the accumulation of inflows over the infinite past, less the outflow, written 
as41:   
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where the exit rate at time t of those unemployed for k periods is: 
q d f( , ) ( ) ( )k t t comp t kk= × × -      for  k > 0   (40) 
q f( , ) . ( ) ( )0 0 5t t comp t= × ×        (41) 
The coefficient 0.5 in the expression of q(0,t) is used to reflect the fact that, on average over 
quarter t, only half the inflow for quarter t has already entered unemployment yet and is ‘at risk’ of 
leaving unemployment. f(t) is the core outflow rate, dk is the term representing duration 
dependence, and comp(t-k) represents the mean inflow quality at time t-k. 
To keep things tractable, we truncate the infinite sum in (39) at eight periods, beyond which 
we assume that everyone leaves unemployment42.  We use the inflow rate and core outflow rate 
processes estimated in the previous section43.  We model the fluctuating composition of the inflow 
as: 
 
comp t u t( ) ( ) .= 0 568        (42) 
 
It should be noted here that we are therefore using results from two separate estimation 
procedures:  the structural estimation of duration dependence and the time series estimation of the 
aggregate dynamics in this paper.  This may be problematic, but note that since the van den Berg 
and van Ours method works precisely by eliminating the aggregate time effects, this is unavoidable.   
We can now define the equilibrium rate of unemployment.  In equilibrium:   
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41 To simplify the algebra, the inflow rate is here normalised by the labour force. 
42 We check whether this simplification has a significant impact on our results by tracking the proportion of the 
unemployed it affects, and we report below that it just affects 3% on average. 
43 The main estimation reported in the previous section was for the inflow rate defined relative to the stock of 
employed, as this is the key behavioural factor.  For simulation purposes, we used the inflow relative to the 
labour force, and so re-estimated for that.  The equation reported below is very similar to those reported above.   
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where the upper bars indicate equilibrium values.  The duration dependence coefficient, d, is set 
equal to 0.85 following our estimation results44.  This gives us a complex polynomial equation to 
solve for u .  We approach the solution of this equation graphically by plotting the right hand side of 
equation (43) as a function of u against u , and calculate the intersection(s) with the 45 degree line.  
The expression on the right hand side turns out to be a convex function of u and we find two values 
of equilibrium unemployment at 0.09 and 0.16.  Note that this is a more complex model than the 
simple model in Section 2 since we now take account of duration dependence and heterogeneity.  
Even so, we find two equilibria with the upper one being unstable.  We therefore conclude that the 
Section 2 model is a reasonable simplification of this more general one.  We run the simulations 
below around the stable equilibrium. 
 
(b)  Results 
 
The aim of this section is to illustrate the main points of the paper using the estimated relationships.  
First we look at the impact of an inflow shock on unemployment duration and the outflow rate.  This 
is a pure inflow shock – the constant in the inflow equation is increased for 4 quarters.  Figure 13 
shows the results:  it displays the inflow and core outflow rates in the top left quadrant, the 
unemployment rate in the bottom left, and the average exit rate and proportion of long-term 
unemployed bottom right.  Focussing on this quadrant, we see that the inflow shock, via higher 
unemployment has raised the proportion of long-term unemployed, and that this effect persists for 
some time.  Certainly it persists after the inflow shock has stopped.  Similarly, the average exit rate 
(total exits over stock) declines.  The point here is simply that the outflow rate and duration structure 
can change consequent upon an inflow shock.  This is even after accounting for the duration 
dependence and heterogeneity we found in the first stage of the estimation. 
Second, we investigate the nonlinear dynamics implied by the model we set out in Section 2.  
The feature of interest is the slow reaction to big shocks and the quick reaction to small shocks.  In 
this case, the shocks are to the cycle variable, affecting both the inflow and (in a transient fashion) 
the outflow.  The setup here is more complex than in Section 2 as we have incorporated the 
dynamics in the core outflow rate, duration dependence and the cyclical heterogeneity in the inflow 
rate.   
Figures 14 and 15 show the results.  The key feature is the delayed reaction of the 
unemployment stock following the large shock.  Once past the initial peak in unemployment (this 
arises from over-shooting the high equilibrium u*2, but coming back, due to the dynamics in the core 
outflow rate), the rate of decline in uenmployment is lower than in Figure 14 with a much smaller 
shock.  Again, note that the outflow rate is more persistently affected than is the inflow rate.  This 
arises from its stronger dependence on the unemployment rate and the slow adjsutment of this. 
 
 
                                                                 
44 In the estimation, we allowed different rates of decline of the offer rate over the first four quarters.  Here we 
impose a common value over eight quarters, the value used being an average of the estimates.   
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7.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have made two main points.  First, we have argued that the view that 
unemployment in Britain changes primarily because of changes in unemployment duration is wrong.  
Many authors have noted the association between the unemployment rate and unemployment 
duration, both within a country over time, and across countries.  This association is, however, usually 
left unmodelled, although some authors do make explicit the implication that unemployment therefore 
is a duration problem.  This is the standard interpretation of the high correlation between the 
unemployment rate and average unemployment duration (Figure 7), and the relative changes in the 
inflow and outflow rates (Figure 8).  Using a model in which the unemployment rate, the outflow rate 
and the inflow rate are all jointly endogenous, we have investigated whether the correlation arises 
solely through the accounting identity linking these, or to a behavioural dependence of the outflow 
rate on unemployment.  Our key results showed that outflow shocks are relatively unimportant for 
unemployment (i.e. there is not much action through the accounting identity from the outflow rate 
influencing unemployment), but that the outflow rate does indeed depend on unemployment.   
Second, we have proposed a new explanation of the ‘complex’ dynamics in aggregate 
unemployment, including persistence at some times and not at others.  Our explanation is based on 
market-level externalities arising through the processes of job matching and job competition between 
employed and unemployed searchers.  Our results show that the data fit the model well.   
Our line of argument suggests that the concentration of both policy and research on duration 
may have been over-done.  Analysis of the unemployment flows needs to set them within the matrix 
of all the labour market flows.  The importance of inflows in the dynamics of unemployment, and the 
role of job-to-job quits, now seems a ripe topic for further investigation. 
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Table 1:  Unemployment Stocks and Flows.  1967:1 – 1998:4 
 
Levels      
 Unemployment Inflows Outflows Employment Labour Force 
      
 Mean 1720.45 982.14 976.32 24537.78 26258.23 
 Median 1575.86 982.63 978.48 24242.00 25801.49 
 Maximum 3282.02 1352.48 1396.12 26701.07 28163.69 
 Minimum 436.47 679.87 682.51 22691.02 23995.08 
 Std.  Dev.  922.01 133.84 137.16 1001.09 1394.77 
      
 Observations 127 127 127 127 127 
Rates      
 Unemployment Inflow(1) Outflow(1) Inflow(2) Outflow(2) 
 Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate 
 Mean 0.0644 0.0402 0.8304 0.0375 0.0372 
 Median 0.0565 0.0404 0.5363 0.0382 0.0379 
 Maximum 0.1205 0.0557 2.2764 0.0493 0.0509 
 Minimum 0.0174 0.0258 0.3069 0.0242 0.0244 
 Std.  Dev.  0.0332 0.0063 0.5901 0.0055 0.0052 
      
 Observations 127 127 127 127 127 
 
(1) Relative to the appropriate stock 
(2) Relative to the labour force 
 
 
Table 2:  Variance Decomposition 
 
Definition of inflow and outflow 
rates: 
R2 (i) 
(holding Outflow 
rate fixed) 
R2 (x) 
(holding Inflow 
rate fixed) 
R2 (i) / [R2 (x)+R2 (i)] 
  
I/L, X/L 0.50 0.09 0.84 
I/L, X/U 0.03 0.92 0.03 
    
I/L, X/L    
1967:3 – 1973:3 0.86 0.11 0.88 
1973:4 – 1979:4 0.98 0.33 0.75 
1980:1 – 1986:1 0.72 0.95 0.43 
1986:2 – 1992:3 0.20 0.32 0.38 
1992:4 – 1998:3 0.72 0.56 0.56 
I/L, X/U    
1967:3 – 1973:3 0.00 0.67 0.00 
1973:4 – 1979:4 0.02 0.91 0.02 
1980:1 – 1986:1 0.80 0.97 0.45 
1986:2 – 1992:3 0.97 0.86 0.53 
1992:4 – 1998:3 0.86 0.93 0.48 
    
Using data adjusted for time 
aggregation 
   
I/L, X/U 0.05 0.92 0.05 
 
All regressions for (men+women), “dynamic” fitting of u. 
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Table 3:  R2 From Innovation Analysis 
 
Sample No Inflow 
Innovations 
No Outflow 
Innovations 
Raw Data   
1970:1 - 1998:3 0.43 0.85 
1980:1 - 1998:3 0.11 0.67 
   
Data adjusted for 
time aggregation 
  
1970:1 - 1998:3 0.56 0.80 
1980:1 - 1998:3 0.02 0.52 
 
Each entry is the R2 from a regression of the unemployment 
rate against a constant and a synthetic unemployment series 
constructed as described in the text assuming either that all 
inflow innovations are zero (column 1) or all outflow 
innovations are zero (column 2) 
 
 
Table 4:  Estimation of the Structural Model 
 
 Estimated 
coefficient 
Standard error 
h1 0.784 0.024 
h2 0.908 0.018 
h3 0.912 0.015 
g2 1.012 0.039 
g3 1.022 0.158 
g4 1.180 0.495 
Woct 0.973 0.008 
Wjan 0.985 0.008 
Wapr 1.059 0.008 
a 0.568 0.052 
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Table 5:  Estimation of the Inflow Rate Model 
 
Dep.  Var.  Inflow rate (male); Sample 1985:4 1998:3 
 
  
Cycle (t-1) -0.138 (2.38)
Unemp.  Rate 0.172 (5.69)
D Unemp.  Rate 0.460 (4.53)
q3 0.000 (0.51)
q2 -0.006 (4.98)
q1 -0.008 (5.17)
Constant 0.032 (10.10)
 
# Observations 52 
R-squared 0.874 
Adjusted R-squared 0.857 
S.E.  of regression 0.003007 
Sum squared resid 0.000407 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  2 lags 
F-statistic 1.328     Probability 0.275869 
Obs*R-squared 3.023     Probability 0.220546 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  5 lags 
F-statistic 0.892397     Probability 0.495388 
Obs*R-squared 5.218461     Probability 0.389805 
ARCH Test:  5 lags 
F-statistic 1.179408     Probability 0.335861 
Obs*R-squared 5.909987     Probability 0.315076 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.818967     Probability 0.678813 
Obs*R-squared 18.94796     Probability 0.588478 
Omitted Variables:  TREND 
F-statistic 0.002284     Probability 0.962101 
Log likelihood ratio 0.002699     Probability 0.958568 
Omitted Variables:  TREND, TREND2 
F-statistic 0.778876     Probability 0.465287 
Log likelihood ratio 1.850474     Probability 0.396437 
Chow Breakpoint Test:  1991:1  
F-statistic 0.444147     Probability 0.867862 
Log likelihood ratio 4.089364     Probability 0.769429 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity of Unemp.  rate  
t-statistic 0.53     Probability 0.60 
Regressors:  u(-1) to (-5), t, t2, cycle(-1), q1, q2, q3.   
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Table 6:  Estimation of the Outflow Rate Model 
 
Dep.  Var.  Core outflow rate (xc); Samp le:  1986:2 1998:3 
 
   
D2 Cycle 4.015 (2.39)  
Unemp.  Rate  -3.901 (2.66)  
xc(t-1) 1.121 (7.22)  
xc(t-2) -0.399 (2.88)  
Dummy from 96:1 0.101 (3.37)  
q1 0.712 (9.93)  
q2 0.363 (10.32)  
q3 0.481 (16.79)  
Constant 0.503 (1.56)  
   
# Observations 50   
R-squared 0.980   
Adjusted R-squared 0.977   
S.E.  of regression 0.068949   
Sum squared resid 0.194913   
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  2 lags 
F-statistic 1.206386     Probability 0.310199 
Obs*R-squared 2.913077     Probability 0.233042 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  5lags 
F-statistic 0.769610     Probability 0.577872 
Obs*R-squared 4.828405     Probability 0.437179 
ARCH Test:  5 lags 
F-statistic 0.822730     Probability 0.369010 
Obs*R-squared 0.842984     Probability 0.358545 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 2.008319     Probability 0.097443 
Obs*R-squared 43.04814     Probability 0.228241 
Omitted Variables:  Cycle 
F-statistic 0.027537     Probability 0.869037 
Log likelihood ratio 0.034410     Probability 0.852838 
Omitted Variables:  TREND, TREND2 
F-statistic 1.165203     Probability 0.322479 
Log likelihood ratio 2.901841     Probability 0.234354 
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Table 7:  Alternative Estimates of the Outflow Rate Model 
 
å
=
-=
4
0
4
j
i
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Dep.  Var.  Core outflow rate (xc) ; Sample:  1986:2 1998:3 
 
 Inflow rate   Inflow 
Innovations 
 
D2 Cycle 3.314 (1.8) D2 Cycle 2.622 (1.4) 
Inflow Rate (t-1)  -6.917 (2.5) S4II (t-1)  -5.506 (2.4) 
xc(t-1) 1.143 (6.3) xc(t-1) 1.156 (6.5) 
xc(t-2) -0.293 (1.6) xc(t-2) -0.228 (1.2) 
D(96:1) 0.100 (2.6) D(96:1) 0.091 (2.5) 
q1 0.677 (8.5) q1 0.675 (8.7) 
q2 0.350 (8.5) q2 0.395 (9.6) 
q3 0.436 (11.1) q3 0.479 (15.7) 
Constant 0.218 (1.0) Constant -0.265 (3.6) 
      
# Obs. 50 50  
R2 0.981 0.980  
Adj.  R2 0.977 0.976  
S.E.   0.06853 0.07027  
SSR 0.19256 0.20244  
Note:  White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  2 lags (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.406  0.895  
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  5 lags (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.693  0.908  
ARCH Test:  5 lags (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.116  0.465  
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.005  0.047  
Omitted Variables:  Cycle (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.717  0.113  
Omitted Variables:  TREND, TREND2 (F-statistic version) 
p-value 0.618  0.069  
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Figure 1:  Dynamics of Unemployment 
 
u
(t
)-
u
(t
-1
)
u(t)
0
0
33  
Figure 2:  Half-Life of Unemployment Shocks 
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Figure 3:  Unemployment Flows 
 
A.  Flows – All  
 
B.  Flows – Men 
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C.  Unemployment Stock 
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Figure 4:  Unemployment Flow Rates 
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Figure 5:  Time Aggregation 
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Figure 6a:  TTWA Flows  
Darker line is inflows 
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Figure 6b:  TTWA Flow Rates 
Darker line is inflow rate 
 
Birmingham
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
.03
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Bristol
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.005
.01
.015
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Edinburgh
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Glasgow
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
.03
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Heathrow
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.005
.01
.015
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Leeds
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Liverpool
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
0
.1
.2
.3
 
London
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.005
.01
.015
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Manchester
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
.03
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
.03
.04
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Nottingham
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.01
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
 
Watford and Luton
 
Jan 1985 Jan 1988 Jan 1991 Jan 1994 Jan 1997
0
.005
.01
.015
.02
0
.1
.2
.3
40 
Figure 7:  Unemployment Duration 
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Figure 8:  Unemployment Flow Rates and Equilibrium 
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Figure 9:  Recursive Least Squares 
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Figure 10:  Impulse Response 
 
Note:  Outflow rate is X/U and inflow rate is I/L 
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Figure 11:  Comparison of Shocks to Unemployment 
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Figure 12:  Recursive Estimation of Inflow Equation 
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Figure 13:  Effects of a Shift in the Inflow Function 
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Figure 14:  Effects of a Small Cyclical Shock 
 
 
 
Figure 15:  Effects of a Large Cyclical Shock 
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